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The Corporate Mortgage Under Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the 
New York Solution 
New York's Uniform Commercial Code went into effect on 
September 27, 1964.1 The decade of study and debate preceding its 
adoption was accompanied by the most extensive hearings and 
consequent recommendations undertaken in any state so far,2 and, 
as in most states adopting the Code, New York's version includes 
many important variations from the 1958 and 1962 Official Texts. 
Among other deviations in Article 9,3 New York has added to 
section 9-302(1) two provisions4 which are intended to cope with 
the long-term financing problems of both existing and future cor-
porate indentures.5 These problems have been severely neglected 
by Article 9, which was designed primarily to solve the complexities 
of short-term lending.6 
A corporate mortgage has been defined as "an indenture intended 
to convey property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, to a 
trustee for bondholders, as security for the bonds issued and to 
be issued thereunder" by a corporation.7 This financing device, 
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553 (effective Sept. 27, 1964). 
2. See the 1954-56 N.Y. I.Aw REVISION CoMM'N REP.; Report of the Law Revision 
Commission to the Legislature Relating to the Uniform Commercial Code, N.Y. I..EG. 
Doc. No. 65(A) (1956). See generally Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 2 AMERICAN BUSINESS L.J. 137, 143-48 (1964); Braucher, The 1956 
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. REv. 3 (1956); Panel Discussion, 
Report of the New York Law Revision Commission-Areas of Agreement and Dis-
agreement, Bus. Law., Nov. 1956, p. 49. 
3. The changes in New York's version of Article 9 are explained in Penney & 
Hogan, Commercial Law, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 273 (1963); Penney, New York Revisits 
the Code-Some Variations in the New York Enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 992 (1962); cf. Auerbach & Goldston, Variations in the Ohio 
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 22 (1962); 5 VILL. L. 
REV. 465 (1960). 
4. N.Y. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-302(l)(b), (k). The changes in § 9-302(1) 
were responsive to the 1962 Report and Recommendation of the Permanent Editorial 
Board, S. INT. No. 2135, Pr. No. 4110; A. INT. No. 3531, Pr. No. 5829. The 1962 
Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited U.C.C., and 
the New York version will hereinafter be cited N.Y. U.C.C. 
5. See notes 148-57 infra and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., l COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM 
CoMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3.13, 13.01, at 1342 n.2 (1963). The late Professor Karl Llewellyn 
recognized these problems in the early stages of the drafting of the Code, Llewellyn, 
Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 I.Aw & CONTEMP. PROB. 687, 691 (1948), but 
bis limited warning seems to have gone unheeded. Mr. Peter Coogan, a member of 
the Permanent Editorial Board's Subcommittee No. 3 to consider Article 9, has 
written many excellent articles in various law reviews during the past decade con-
cerning Article 9 and its application. These articles, together with contributions from 
other prominent authors on secured transactions, have been collected and updated 
in two volumes, l & 2 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, op. cit. supra (1963-64). References 
to the articles included in the book will hereinafter be cited as l or 2 COOGAN. 
7. McCLELLAND & FisHER, CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND lssuES 11 (1937). New York 
defines a corporate mortgage as "a mortgage creating a lien upon real and personal 
[1045] 
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utilized by many large corporate organizations, has grown to be of 
paramount importance in the field of corporate financing,8 and 
the lack of attention given by the Code to the long-term debts of 
corporations has raised serious questions of filing procedures. Dis-
cussion of the novel treatment accorded by New York to the prob-
lem of perfecting security interests in corporate mortgages will 
constitute the main part of this comment. That state's treatment 
deserves scrutiny both because of the magnitude of effort expended 
by New York on the study of the Code before its adoption and 
because of its traditional role as a commercial and financial leader. 
The New York statutory provisions relevant to the problems of 
perfecting the indenture will be reviewed and an attempt will be 
made to explain their practical effect on mortgages executed subse-
quent to the Code. The problems associated with the transition to 
the Code from the conglomerate pre-Code New York lien law 
for indentures existing at the effective date of the Code will be 
discussed, and methods concerning the alleviation of these dif-
ficulties suggested. However, before dealing with the various ramifica-
tions of the New York version, it may prove helpful to explore the 
broad background of the relationship generally between Article 9 
and the corporate mortgage. 
I. GENERAL EFFECT OF THE u.c.c. ON Posr-CODE 
CORPORATE INDENTURES 
A. Filing 
The Code will increase the utility of the corporate mortgage as a 
financing tool for both the borrower and the secured party.9 But 
filing requirements present several problems to the corporate prac-
property, exceuted by a corporation ...• " N.Y. LIEN LA.w § 190. It is clear that 
the use of the term and the applicability of the aforementioned statutes are not 
limited to railroad or utility corporations in New York, but apply to the mortgage of 
a manufacturing company as well. In re F. &: D. Co., 256 Fed. 73 (2d Cir. 1919). The 
terms corporate mortgage, corporate indenture, combined mortgage, and package 
mortgage, will be used synonymously in this comment, and no reference will be 
made to an unsecured indenture. 
8. For the historical development of the corporate indenture, see McCLELLAND 
& FisHER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1-5; Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 
HARv. L R.Ev. 1333-69 (1963); Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate 
Mortgage, 2 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 71 (1930); Drinker, Concerning Modern Corporate 
Mortgages, 74 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 360 (1926). The entire spectrum of the corporate in• 
denture field has been concisely treated in KENNEDY, CoRFORATE TRUST .Ai>MINIS· 
TRATION (1961). 
9. Article 9 is intended to replace prior law dealing with various forms of chattel 
security including mortgages, conditional sales, trust receipts, factors liens, etc. For 
general approaches and explanations of Article 9, see 1 CoOGAN §§ 1.01-4.10; Kripke 
& Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions-A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 168 (1962); Kripke, The Modernization 
of Concepts Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 Bus. LAW, 645 
(1960). 
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titioner working under the Official Text, which offers no special 
filing rules for this form of transaction.10 
Since the indenture involves real estate as well as other property, 
the mortgagor must record it in the appropriate real property 
records.11 For all personal property subject to the mortgage, filing 
is required in the central filing system of the state12 and, in certain 
states, in the local records also if the mortgagor has a place of busi-
ness in one county only.18 Pre-Code filing requirements for corporate 
mortgages frequently appeared to be singularly stringent. Unless 
special filing provisions had been made for these indentures,14 the 
security interest in personal property embodied in the indenture 
became subject to the local chattel mortgage filing statutes. Most 
such statutes required, in addition to filing wherever the property 
was located, periodic refiling.15 The seeming stringency of these 
statutes was illusory, however, since the chattel mortgage refiling 
requirements were largely ignored by the mortgagor, whose inaction 
was acquiesced in by the trustee.16 Several states alleviated the burden 
either by not requiring the refiling of chattel mortgages or by giving a 
special filing exemption to railroad and public utility corporations,17 
10. The law in most states prior to the Code also lacked special provisions for the 
filing of corporate indentures. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 511.01 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. 
§ 44M60 (1952). But cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2317 (1953). See generally Comment, 
Uniform Commerdal Code Article 9 Filing Procedures for Railroad, Utility, and Other 
Corporate Debtors, 62 MICH. L. REv. 865 (1964). It should be remembered that an 
important goal of Article 9 is to do away with the many artificial distinctions of 
pre-Code law relating to liens on personal property, many of which were based only 
on the form that the transaction had taken. Comment to U.C.C. § 9-101. While there 
is no disagreement with the basic soundness of such an ideal, this does not mean 
that the corporate indenture does not merit a special filing provision on the basis 
of form alone or intrinsic difference, such as New York has provided. 
11. The Code exempts real estate transactions from its coverage specifically in 
U.C.C. § 9-104(j), and by implication in § 9-102(1), (2), except insofar as rights and 
duties pertaining to personal property or fixtures are involved, as in combined mort-
gages. Filing problems will be of concern to the corporate mortgagor as well as to the 
indenture trustee and bondholders because the agreement typically imposes on the 
mortgagor a duty to comply with filing requirements to avoid default. 
12. u.c.c. § 9-401(1). 
I!. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c) (optional paragraph). The official text offers three alter-
natives for subsection (1). If the third is selected in the adopting state, the double 
filing for all personal property except fixtures is required if the debtor " ••• has a 
place of business in only one county of this state" or " ••• if the debtor has no place 
of business in this state, but resides in the state, also in the office of •.• .the county 
in which he resides." Ibid. For a list of the options adopted by the several 
code states, together with other filing rules in those states, see 1 COOGAN § 6.13. Some 
states have forsaken central filing in favor of exclusively local filing, a very question• 
able alternative. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-9-401(1) (1962). 
14. See the statutes cited note 10 supra. 
15. E.g., lowA CODE § 556-12 (1950). 
16. Letter from Frank H. Heiss of the New York Bar to Frank R. Kennedy, Nov. 
18, 1963, on file in the offices of the Michigan Law Review. See Comment, supra note 
10, at 869-70. 
17. E.g., IowA CoDE § 476.15 (1949); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 45:382-.384 (1951). The 
financing of public utilities, railroads, and other carriers and the filing of the security 
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to all corporations,18 or to all mortgagors of real and personal 
property.19 Among states adopting the Code, some of these exemp-
tions have been retained,20 and some are of doubtful status,21 but 
many Code states have not given any type of exemption to corporate 
mortgages. In these latter jurisdictions, the burden placed on cor-
porate mortgagors by the relatively short duration of the perfected 
security interest recognized by some chattel mortgage filing statutes 
will be partially lessened by the Code's section 9-403, requiring a 
continuation statement to be filed only once every five years. No 
additional periodic filing is required if the original post-Code in-
denture filing perfects a security interest in after-acquired property.22 
The filing requirements of the Code relative to the perfection of 
security interests in purely personal property included in the in-
denture generally impose no insuperable burden on the corporate 
mortgagor. 
On the other hand, the Code's treatment of filing requirements 
for fixtures, items which will almost certainly be included in the 
indenture, has created considerable confusion.23 Lack of clarity in 
the fixture section of the Code will ultimately necessitate multiple 
filing and recording in Code states not utilizing a special exemption 
for corporate indentures. While the provisions for fixture filing 
seem clear on the surface, certain deficiencies of draftsmanship have 
generated many problems for those charged with the responsibility 
of filing in the appropriate records. Section 9-40l(l)(b) provides 
simply for the proper place to file to perfect a security interest: 
"when the collateral is goods which at the time the security interest 
interests on the assets thereof present many specialized problems. See generally Adkins 
&: Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment Financing, IS Bus. LAw. 
199 (1958); Adkins &: Billyou, Current Developments in Railroad Equipment Financing, 
12 Bus. I.Aw. 207 (1957); Comment, supra note 10; Comment, Mobile Equipment 
Financing-Federal Perfection of Carrier Liens, 67 YALE L.J. 1024 (1958). 
18. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 2317 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 196-2, 343-52 
(Supp. 1963); N.Y. LIEN I.Aw § 231. 
19. Ohio Acts, 1959, § 1319.03, at 9. 
20. E.g., N.Y. u.c.c. § 9-302(I)(k); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.2l(C)(2) (Page Supp. 
1964). Also, some states have added provisions, usually to § 9-302(3)(b), which are 
meant to exempt various classes of mortgages from filing, but the clarity and effective-
ness of these additions are still in considerable doubt. Comment, supra note 10, at 872 
n.36. 
21. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 94-301(10) (1958); MONT. REv. CODE .ANN. § 72-211 
(Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. tit. 66, §§ 14, 15 (1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 67, § 523 (1930). 
See Comment, supra note IO, at 872. 
22. u.c.c. § 9-204(3). 
23. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 8; Hollander, Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio 
Fixture Liens, 14 W. R.Es. L. REv. 683 (1963); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 44 (1964); Shanker, A Further Critique of the 
Fixture Section of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 BosroN COLI.EGE INDUSI'RIAL 
&: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 61 (1964); Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for Pur-
chase Money Collateral-A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Section 
9-JlJ of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE L.J. 788 (1964). 
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attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a 
mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded." 
Subsection 9-313(1) is the root of the fixture filing problem be-
cause it carries over much of a state's pre-Code law concerning 
whether and when various items become fixtures.24 Subsequent 
subsections set out specific priority rules, but their effectiveness 
depends upon first ascertaining the category of property into which 
the item in question belongs. The difficulty in relying on pre-Code 
fixture law for classification guidance is that much prior fixture law 
is on the precipice of anarchy.25 The New York fixture rule, ac-
cepted by the majority of states, has long recognized and defined 
the fixture category and has generally granted priority to the fixture-
secured party over the holder of a prior real estate security interest.26 
In the states following New York, the transition to the Code will 
create less confusion regarding fixtures than in other states since 
the category of "fixtures" has an accepted meaning and applica-
bility.27 However, a minority of states have refused to recognize a 
specific class of property called "fixtures." Some have determined 
priority purportedly by reference to whether the installation has 
become part of realty or remained personal property,28 but the 
actual determination of priority has been judged by the equities 
of the particular situation.29 A strong influence on these minority 
states has been the nebulous "material injury to the freehold" test, 
24. U.C.C. § 9-313(1): "The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated 
into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and 
the like and no security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure 
remains personal property under applicable law. The law of this state other than 
this Act determines whether and when other goods become fixtures. The Act does 
not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the 
law applicable to real estate." See generally 2 CooGAN § 17.09; Kripke, supra note 23, 
at 47; Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1391-1400. 
25. 2 COOGAN §§ 16.06, 17.09. For pre-Code articles vainly attempting to construct 
a coherent system from the morass, see Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning the 
Law of Fixtures, 7 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1907); Friedman, The Scope of Mortgage 
Liens on Fixtures and Personal Property in New York, 7 FORDHAM L. REv. 331 (1938); 
Kratovil, Fixtures and the Real Estate Mortgagee, 97 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 180 (1948); Niles, 
The Rationale of the Law of Fixtures, 11 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 560 (1934). 
26. E.g., Madfes v. Beverly Dev. Corp., 251 N.Y. 12, 166 N.E. 787 (1929); Tifft v. 
Horton, 53 N.Y. 377 (1873). But cf. Roche v. Thurber, 246 App. Div. 850, 285 N.Y. 
Supp. 82 (1936), aff d mem., 272 N.Y. 582, 4 N.E.2d 814 (1936). See also 2 COOGAN 
§ 17.03, at 1789 n.13; Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1365 n.75. There is an exception to 
this general rule in the case of construction mortgages. See e.g., Grupp v. Margolis, 
153 Cal. App. 2d 500, 504, 314 P.2d 820, 823 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Gilmore, supra 
at 1367-69. It would appear that the U.C.C. draftsmen contemplated only the majority 
rule when drafting § 9-313(1). Gilmore, supra at 1395. 
27. See id. at 1394. 
28. E.g., Clary v. Owen, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 522 (1860). See 2 COOGAN § 17.03; 
Gilmore supra note 8, at 1355-58. Some of the uncertainty in Massachusetts was dis-
pelled by Mass. Acts 8: Resolves 1943, ch. 52 § I (repealed by the U.C.C.). Professor 
Gilmore has concluded that the difference between the majority and minority views 
was more of form than substance. Gilmore, supra at 1357. 
29. For an illustration, see Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, 5 N.E. 160 (1886). 
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which generally classifies property in a priority dispute by whether 
its removal would substantially lessen the value of the remaining 
real estate. Some jurisdictions have conceived other unfortunate 
doctrines.so Within a single jurisdiction, the same installation occa-
sionally has been held to be in several different property categories, 81 
and buildings have even been classified as personal property.82 
The basic remedy for default provided by the Code is remova-
bility of fixtures; 33 many states, however, have previously termed a 
removable fixture "a contradiction in words,"34 thus defeating the 
Code's remedial cornerstone because of the section 9-313(1) loop-
hole. The priority rules provided in subsections 9-313(2), (3), and 
(4) are weighted on the side of the fixture financier, but in light 
of the pre-Code ideological morass concerning whether and when 
an item is a fixture, it is uncertain to what extent this priority will 
be effective.s5 It will often be difficult for the lawyer in a Code juris-
diction to be able to ascertain, with any appreciable degree of cer-
tainty, into which category of property a given item may later be 
held to have been included.36 Therefore, in order to be safe where 
the possibility of a classification dispute exists, it is necessary for the 
practitioner to file both in the fixture side of the real estate records 
office and in the personal property filing system.37 If many transac-
tions involving fixtures are expected, multiple filing may become 
inconvenient, but inconvenience is preferable to a later invalidation 
of the security interest.ss This filing burden will be encountered 
only infrequently when the transaction is a corporate mortgage, how-
30. For example, the infamous Pennsylvania "industrial plant" doctrine and the 
New Jersey "institutional" doctrine. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1!160; Leary, 
Financing New Machinery for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Industrial Plants, 4 Vn.L. 
L. REv. 498 (1959); Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform 
Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16 U. Prrr. L. REv. 
89 (1955). Gilmore maintains that the Code has abolished these aberrations. Gilmore, 
supra at 1!197-98. But see 2 COOGAN § 16.06(1), at 1712 n.68; Kripke, supra note 2!1, 
at 63 n.65. 
31. Compare Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 (1867), with Lorain Steel 
Co. v. Norfolk &: B. St. Ry., 187 Mass. 500, 73 N.E. 646 (1905). Compare Farrar v. 
Stackpole, 6 Me. 154 (1829), with Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, 5 N.E. 160 
(1886). See also 2 COOGAN § 17.09. 
32. Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Bunde, 50 N.D. 408, 196 N.W. 312 (1923); Royal Store 
Fixture Co. v. Patten, 18!1 Pa. Super. 249, 1!10 A.2d 271 (1957). 
33. u.c.c. § 9-31!1(5). 
34. See Teaff v. Hewitt, I Ohio St. 511 (185!1). See 2 COOGAN § 16.06(1). 
35. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1395. 
36. Id. at 1392-93. 
37. See generally 2 CooGAN §§ 16.04-.05, 16.09, 17.07; Kripke, supra note 23, at 61. 
Suggestions for the improvement of the Code's treatment are found in 2 COOGAN 
§§ 17.08-.09; and the authorities cited in note 2!1 supra. Massachusetts has provided 
that present or future fixtures included in a mortgage of real property need not be 
filed in the fixture records, but that a real estate recording will perfect the security 
interest therein. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 9-409(3) (1963). 
38. For an analysis of the treatment accorded and to be accorded fixture interests 
in bankruptcy, see 2 CooGAN § 17.06. 
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ever, since the multiple filing and recording need be made only at 
the time the original indenture is executed, at whatever interval 
supplemental mortgages39 are to be executed (if at all) and at the 
time continuation statements40 are due. 
B. Security in Fixed Assets 
Security interests in equipment and machinery have long been 
recognized as valid in the corporate indenture, both as to items 
originally included in the mortgage and after-acquired property of 
this nature.41 Under the U.C.C., a timely filing of the indenture will 
subordinate all subsequent liens on these items.42 However, security 
interests in after-acquired equipment and machinery, although 
generally safe, can be subjected to a purchase-money security in-
terest in that equipment.43 The indenture trustee may not learn 
of subsequent purchase-money liens,44 but the problem presented is 
relatively small because it is highly unlikely that the total amount of 
purchase-money security in equipment outstanding at any given time 
will be appreciably great. The turnover of these larger items is usually 
slow.45 
C. Security in Current Assets 
The Code's greatest potential for change lies in the area of long-
term security interests in current assets. Pre-Code law was generally 
harsh on the bondholders under an indenture which included an 
after-acquired property clause46 that was intended to apply to in-
ventory, accounts receivable, or other intangibles, i.e., a "floating 
lien."41 Draftsmen long ago gave up the attempt to include con-
ll9. See notes lll6-47 infra and accompanying text. 
40. U.C.C. § 9-403. See notes 125-35 infra and accompanying text. 
41. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1349-50, 1354. 
42. U.C.C. § 9-312(5) (the "first-to-file" rule). 
43. U.C.C. § 9-312(4). See generally Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1385-88. A closely-
related area is the purchase-money priority in fixtures. See id. at 1388-1400. 
44. 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4), at 1379 n.104. 
45. Ibid. 
46. For pre-Code treatments of the after-acquired property clause in the corporate 
indenture, see generally Blair, The Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgaged Property 
Among Rival Claimants, 40 HARv. L. REv. 222 (1926); Cohen &: Gerber, The After-
Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 635 (1939); Foley &: Pogue, After• 
Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Indentures, 13 MINN. L. 
REv. 81 (1929); Israels &: Kramer, The Significance of the Income Clause in a Cor-
porate Mortgage, 30 CoLuM. L. REv. 488 (1930). 
47. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Lee v. State Bank &: Trust 
Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930); Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926); Zartman 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907); COOGAN §§ 3.03(2), 3.07, 3.08; 
Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1334-35. Compare Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 
570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894), with Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 8ll (1890). See 
generally Burman, Practical A~pects of Inventory and Receivables Finandng, 13 LAw 
&: CoNTEMP. PROB. 555 (1948); Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Finandng, 
62 HARV. L. REv. 588 (1949). For a comparison of the English and American floating 
liens, see 1 COOGAN § 13.08. Some of the English legal literature on the subject has 
been compiled in Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1334 n.2. 
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tinuing liens on such assets in the corporate mortgage,48 for any of 
a number of factors could invalidate all or part of the indenture. 
The most notable of these factors was the "dominion rule" of 
Benedict v. Ratner.49 In that case, Mr. Justice Brandeis, purporting 
to apply New York law,50 held that an attempted assignment of 
accounts receivable in an indenture was void as to other creditors 
where the secured party had not kept sufficient control over the 
collateral to demonstrate his interest therein to other creditors. 51 
The typical indenture trustee has neither the power nor the 
resources to maintain the policing system called for by Benedict.52 
Even if such a system were feasible under pre-Code law, the security 
in the assets would provide an uncertain priority at best. The buyer 
of the merchandise inventory in the ordinary course of business 
would defeat the prior mortgage. Other current assets or the pro-
ceeds accruing from their sale would likely become "commingled" 
and render the collateral "unidentifiable."53 Further, an established 
judicial doctrine has frequently subordinated the indenture trustee's 
claim against current assets, especially income, to the claims of cur-
. rent creditors,54 and it can be said there has been a long-standing 
judicial distaste for the "floating lien." 
The New York rule was that a clause purporting to include any 
after-acquired property under the mortgage lien was invalid as to 
other creditors unless some further step had been taken to perfect 
it.55 The practice in New York then became to include the dubious 
48. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(3); Gilmore, supra note 8, at 1349. 
49. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
50. However, the only New York case on point at that time, Stackhouse v. Holden, 
66 App. Div. 423, 427, 73 N.Y. Supp. 203, 205 (1901) (mem.), was directly contra. 
51. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Cf. Zinman, Dominion and the Factor's 
Lien-Does Section 45 of the New York Personal Property Law Abrogate the "Do-
minion Rule"?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 59, 63 (1961). A recent application of the Benedict 
doctrine is found in Matter of Cut Rate Furniture Co., 163 F. Supp. 360 (N.D.N.Y. 
1958). For a discussion of the relation between the dominion rule and N.Y. PERS. 
PROP. LAw § 45, see Zinman, supra. The difference between accounts receivable 
financing and factoring is pointed out in Moore, Factoring-A Unique and Important 
Form of Financing and Service, 14 Bus. LAw. 703, 724-25 (1959). 
52. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(3). 
53. See id. § 13.06(4). 
54. See id. § 13.06(3); Israels &: Kramer, supra note 46. Another potential problem 
for the indenture draftsman is the federal tax lien. See 1 COOGAN § lll.07(4): " ••• the 
indenture draftsman must at least be aware that the danger of the tax collector 
making a successful attack on a security transaction may be somewhat increased when 
that transaction involves a 'floating lien' on current assets." See also United States 
v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the 
Federal Government-The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 
YALE L.J. 905 (1954); MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 
1 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &: COMMERCIAL L REv. 73 (1959); Plumb, Federal Tax 
Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAX L. REv. 247 (1958). 
55. Zartman v. First Nat'! Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907); Rochester Dis-
tilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894); McCu:u.AND &s FISHER, op. cit. 
supra note 7, at 284-85, 336-38; Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York, 20 
CoLUM, L. REv. 519 (1920); Zinman, supra note 51, at 67, n.50. For a public utility 
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clause in the indenture and to execute subsequent supplemental 
mortgages to complete the perfection. Noncompliance with this 
procedure resulted in the partial56 or total57 invalidation of the 
mortgage in bankruptcy, even as to assets on which the lien had 
been perfected.58 Most other jurisdictions, however, have allowed 
the indenture trustee considerably more leeway in including after-
acquired property under the mortgage lien.59 
The draftsmen of the Code have attempted to alter radically the 
status of the floating lien.60 Benedict's dominion rule is expressly 
abrogated.61 The Code deals with the problem of the "gap creditor"62 
by generally trying to eliminate the instances which would allow 
the gap to be created.63 Section 9-108 purports to circumvent a 
bankruptcy preference problem in respect to after-acquired col-
lateral. That section states that, under certain conditions, sub-
corporation the rule was otherwise. Pintsch Compressing Co. v. Buffalo Gas Co., 280 
Fed. 830 (2d Cir. 1922); In re Adamant Plaster Co., 137 Fed. 251 (N.D.N.Y. 1905); 
McCLELLAND &: FISHER, supra at 337. See generally Fagan, Sales and Security Law, 26 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 72, 81·95 (1951); Hart, Commercial Law, 35 N.Y.UL. REv. 1477 
(1960). 
56. E.g., Zartman v. First Nat'! Bank, supra note 55. 
57. E.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925); Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d 
Cir. 1926); Arbury v. Kocher, 18 F.2d 588 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). 
58. Ibid. 
59. McCLELLAND &: FISHER, CoRPORATE MORTGAGE BOND Issm:s 340-42 (1937). For 
an old judicial criticism of the New York rule, see Lister v. Simpson, 38 N.J. Eq. 438, 
441 (Ch. 1884), aff'd, 39 N.J. Eq. 595 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1885). 
60. See generally l COOGAN §§ 7.01-.12, 11.01-.09, 13.06; Kripke, Current Assets 
Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REv. 506 (1952); Sutkowski, 
Inventory Financing Under the U.C.C., the Secured Creditor's Dream?, 68 CoM. L.J. 
95 (1963). For analyses and discussions on the treatment Article 9 has been and will 
be accorded in bankruptcy proceedings, see generally Friedman, The Bankruptcy 
Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. 
L. REv. 194 (1959); Kennedy, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on In-
solvency-Article 9, 67 CoM. L.J. 113 (1962); Levy, Effect of The Uniform Commercial 
Code Upon Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 60 CoM. L.J. 9 (1955); Raphael, The 
Status of the Unsecured Creditor in the Modem Law of Secured Transactions, 2 
BOSTON CoLLEGE INDUSTRIAL &: COMMERCIAL L. REv. 303 (1961); Schwartz, The Effect 
of the Uniform Commercial Code on Secured Financing Transactions and Bankruptcy, 
38 REI;. J. 124 (1964); Note, Some Possible Areas of Conflict Between the Illinois 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 418. 
61. U.C.C. § 9-205 and comment. The extension of the Benedict doctrine in Lee 
v. State Bank &: Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931), had previously been nullified in 
New York by the 1943 amendment to § 45 of its personal property law. See Zinman, 
supra note 51, at 84. It has been argued that the original passage of § 45 in 1911 
nullified the dominion rule, Stone, supra note 55, at 532, but the opposite conclusion 
is more persuasive. See Zinman, supra at 92. 
62. A gap creditor is one who extends credit during the period between execution 
and perfection of the security interest. In New York, the protection of general 
creditors was extended by Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893), which 
held that a chattel mortgage filing after the expiration of a reasonable time gave no 
protection against creditors existing at the time of execution. The adoption of the 
Code in New York abolishes this rule. See 1 CooGAN § 3.03. 
63. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -301. See Hawkland, The Impact of the Commercial Code on 
the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67 COM. L.J. 359 (1962). 
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sequently acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for 
new value and not for an antecedent debt, 64 but to what extent this 
attempt will be effectuated by the courts is uncertain.65 The prob-
lems of "commingling" and "unidentifiable proceeds" have been 
provided for,66 albeit with uncertain results.67 To the extent the 
relevant Code provisions do not conflict with federal bankruptcy 
statutes or policy, it will be possible for indenture draftsmen to 
create a valid continuing lien on all of the debtor's assets without 
requiring control over them to be exercised by the secured party. 
However, it is highly unlikely that long-term financing with 
current assets will be widely utilized. Though many of the problems 
have apparently been solved, considerations of the quality of the 
security interests created will tend to keep financiers within the 
traditional pattern of extended lending. For example, the security 
obtained by an indenture on inventory will not be equal either to 
that achieved by the lender who exercises control over the inven-
tory68 or that provided by assets with more permanent attributes.69 
Where little control over the debtor is exercised, there is the risk 
that he will have dealt with his inventory and receivables in such a 
manner that these assets will not be in existence when bankruptcy 
occurs.70 The priority of the buyer in due course71 and the purchase-
money security interest72 are continued under the U.C.C., and, even 
in view of the Code's attempt to afford more protection to the 
secured party in bankruptcy, the extent to which the draftsmen have 
succeeded is uncertain.78 These factors should tend to induce hesi-
tance on the part of the lender desiring to simplify his usual methods 
of financing current assets by executing a long-term mortgage on the 
current assets with a broad after-acquired property clause. 74 Even 
if he decides such a system is feasible, however, the added problem 
of the debtor's liquidity may cause many financiers to forego the 
64. U.C.C. § 9-108. Acquisition of collateral under a contract of purchase pursuant 
to the security agreement within a reasonable -time after new value is given is also 
characterized by this section as not for an antecedent debt, but this saving provision 
is not likely to be important in connection with corporate mortgages. For a discus.don 
as to whether an indenture trustee will prevail over the bankruptcy trustee as to 
inventory acquired within four months of bankruptcy, compare I CooGAN § l!l.07, 
with id. § 10.03. 
65. See id. § 10.03(7)(c). 
66. U.C.C. §§ 9-315, -306 respectively. 
67. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4). 
68. Ibid. See also Moore, supra note 51; Silverman, Factoring as a Financing Device, 
27 HARv. Bus. REv. 594 (1949); Zinman, supra note 51. 
69. See 1 COOGAN § 13.06(4). 
70. Ibid. But one claiming a purchase-money priority in the inventory will be 
required to give notice to the indenture trustee. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). 
71. u.c.c. § 9-307. 
72. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). See 1 CoocAN §§ 11.01-.09; Gilmore, The Purchase Money 
Priority, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 1377-85 (1963). 
73. See the authorities cited note 60 supra. 
74. See 1 CoOGAN § 13.06(4); Gilmore, supra note 72, at 1336. 
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scheme. If the borrower has encumbered all of his assets, he will 
have no collateral on which to finance a short-term loan to ease him 
over a period when he needs ready cash to avoid impending trouble. 
This resulting loss in liquidity, unless carefully provided for in an 
emergency future advance clause from the indenture trustee, 7is may 
increase the debtor's chances of winding up in bankruptcy. The 
diminution or destruction of the value of the business entity as a 
going concern caused by the bankruptcy proceedings would tend to 
inflict an unnecessarily large loss on all creditors.76 Many lenders 
have already recognized that imposing this economic straitjacket 
on the debtor by greedily encumbering all available assets will be 
detrimental to themselves as well as the borrower and have, for the 
most part, continued to use the other operative financing methods 
which were utilized prior to the Code.77 
II. THE NEW YoRK TREATMENT OF CORPORATE 
INDENTURE FILING 
Prior to the Code, the filing of corporate mortgages in New York 
was governed by section 231 of the lien law.78 That section provided 
that a mortgage of real and personal property, executed by a cor-
poration, need be recorded only in the real estate records of the 
counties in which the mortgaged real estate was located.79 Originally 
limited to railroad and utility mortgagors,80 the liberal filing require-
ments were extended to all domestic corporations,81 and later, in 
1960, to foreign companies as well. 82 The pressure for this liberaliza-
tion of filing requirements was generated by the burden of the 
chattel mortgage refiling section,83 which originally required a 
yearly refiling and then, by amendment, a filing every three years. 84 
Section 231 reduced substantially this repetitive and time-consuming 
75. This type of clause would be contrary to the usual practice. See 1 COOGAN 
§ ll!.06(3), at 1375 n.92. 
76. The Code has provided a set of alternative foreclosure remedies for the holder 
of a mortgage on both real and personal property, U.C.C. § 9-501(4). See 1 COOGAN 
§ 8.07(5). But it is highly unlikely that these remedies will be utilized, as foreclosure 
is economically impractical for corporate indentures, the questions relating to which 
will ordinarily be settled in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather than a significant interest 
in the corporate assets, the bondholder actually receives a strong bargaining position 
when trouble occurs. Id. § 13.10. 
77. See Malcolm & Funk, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts Experience Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Bus. I.Aw. 525, 539-41 (1961). 
78. N.Y. LmN I.Aw § 231. 
79. See generally Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 44 (1964). 
80. N.Y. Laws 1868, ch. 779. 
81. N.Y. Laws 1895, ch. 529. See note IO supra. 
82. N.Y. Laws 1960, ch. 1004, § 12; N.Y. Laws 1960, ch. 1004, § 6. See Kripke, supra 
note 79, at 77. 
83. N.Y. Laws 1915, ch. 608, § I; Kripke, supra note 79, at 76. 
84. N.Y. Laws 1943, ch. 451, § I. 
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task for counsel and greatly lessened the indenture trustee's fears of 
subsequent liability for failure to file.85 While comforting to the 
trustee and to counsel, the effect of this section was to create an 
apparently insuperable search problem for a lender seeking to 
ascertain prior liens on a chattel ostensibly owned free and clear by 
the corporation, 86 for the lien could often have been filed in any 
one of a number of county real estate records. This burden was 
largely theoretical, however, because lenders to corporate borrowers 
are a special class of financiers likely to be aware of and to avoid pit-
falls of overextension of credit.87 Immediately prior to the adoption 
of the Code in New York, the primary benefit conferred by section 
231 on corporate mortgagors was the exemption from chattel mort-
gage refiling requirements. 
When the U.C.C. was adopted in New York, section 231 was 
renumbered section 190,88 amended,89 and specifically excepted from 
the general repeal of article ten of the lien law by the U.C.C.90 as 
part of a comprehensive statutory scheme to regulate the filing of 
long-term corporate indentures. Section 190-1 of the lien law now 
provides that all mortgages of real and personal property executed 
by a corporation subsequent to the adoption of the Code will be 
recorded as before; and any security interests in personal property 
or fixtures contained therein will further be required to be perfected 
by the single additional filing of a financing statement in the depart-
ment of state,91 which is the central filing office for all security 
interests in personal property. Section 190-2, which seems to apply 
to mortgages executed both prior and subsequent to the effective 
date of the Code,92 requires that supplemental mortgages executed 
pursuant to the original mortgage must also comply with the dual 
filing and recording procedure set out for future mortgages in the 
first subsection. In the Code itself, New York has added two provi-
sions to section 9-302(1) which are meant to control the filing of 
both existing and future combined mortgages. In the case of in-
dentures recorded prior to the date the Code took effect, section 
9-302(l)(h) stipulates that no financing statement need be filed, but 
that such mortgage shall continue to be governed by 231, the pre-
85. These fears stemmed from two old cases, Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848 (2d 
Cir. 1897); Green v. Title Guar. 8e Trust Co., 223 App. Div. 12, 227 N.Y. Supp. 252, 
afj'd mem., 248 N.Y. 627, 162 N.E. 552 (1928). See generally Kripke, supra note 79, at 
76; Posner, The Trustee and the Trust Indenture, 46 YALE L.J. 737 (1937). 
86. Kripke, supra note 79, at 76. 
87. 2 COOGAN § 16.05. These lenders would have realized ordinarily that it would 
be necessary to check the real property records in the county where the debtor owned 
real estate or to ask the debtor what prior debt he had incurred and where to find it. 
88. N.Y. Laws 1963, ch. 1003, § 45 (McKinney 1963). 
89. Ibid. 
90. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-105. 
91. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-1. 
92. See text accompanying notes 136-39 infra. 
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Code section of the lien law. Section 9-302(l)(k.) looks to future 
combined mortgages and provides that a financing statement for 
the personal property and fixtures covered shall be filed in the 
Department of State only and will be governed by post-Code section 
190. In the Code repealer provisions, New York has attempted to 
bring the outstanding mortgages into the dual filing system within 
one year of the effective date of the Code, sections 9-302(l)(h) and 
231 notwithstanding.98 Other Code provisions of interest to parties 
to a corporate mortgage are 9-403(2) and 9-403(3), under which 
any filed security interest will lapse on its stated maturity date or 
at the end of five years, whichever is earlier, unless a continuation 
statement is filed within six months before or sixty days after the 
maturity date. 
Filing continuation statements will tend to be slightly more 
burdensome than under section 231, which demanded no further 
recording or filing.94 One writer has already proposed an addition 
to the Code to alleviate this relatively minor problem.95 The net 
intended effect of these provisions is to retain the convenience of 
ease of filing and refiling long-term corporate indentures, but to 
impose some additional requirements, and to incorporate these 
security interests into the central filing system for security interests 
in personal property. In summary, the differences in filing between 
the pre-Code law and the Code in New York are essentially twofold: 
First, all original and supplemental corporate mortgages will now 
have to be recorded in the applicable real estate records and 
filed in the central filing system, whereas previously only the former 
was required; second, a continuation statement will henceforth have 
to be filed every five years during the duration of the indenture, 
whereas pre-Code law required no further filing or recording except 
for supplementals. 
Although the author of the New York Practice Commentary to 
93. See notes 124•35 infra and accompanying text. 
94. Although not explicitly stated in the statutes, the assumption bas uniformly 
been made that § 9-403 applies to indentures on file in the Department of State. 
1 COOGAN § 13.04(5); Kripke, supra note 79, at 78 n.112. Section 9-403(2) refers to 
"a filed financing statement," which would surely seem to include a filed corporate 
indenture. Also, § I0-102(2)(b) explicitly requires continuation statements to be 
filed to extend the perfection of existing indentures, but the effectiveness of this 
provision is doubtful. See notes 124-33 infra and accompanying text. But since 
the indentures will be recorded in accordance with N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190 and the 
only filing required is in the department of state office, it may conceivably be argued 
that this evidences a desire to liberalize the filing requirements for the corporate 
indenture and, as § 190 nowhere states that continuation statements shall be 
demanded, the courts should accommodate this desire. This argument is refuted, 
however, both by the language of § 9-302(l)(k), which in terms requires the filing 
of a financing statement in this case and by § 190-1, which requires "filing in 
accordance with part four of article nine." 
95. Kripke, supra note 79, at 78 n.ll2. 
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Article 996 suggests that the main reason for the promulgation of this 
system, based primarily on the retention of the liberal requirements 
embodied in section 190 of the lien law, is to accommodate the 
desire of counsel to avoid the problems associated with fixture 
filing,97 a better procedure would have been to resurrect a central 
filing system for railroads and utilities, without relieving "run-of-
the-mill" corporations from the problems faced by other borrowers 
and lenders generally.98 Fixture filing will present many diffi-
culties to the practitioner dealing with corporate indentures in 
other Code states, as has been discussed above.99 The problems would 
have been considerably less in New York had no separate filing 
provisions for corporate indentures been made, because there the 
law of fixtures, for all its perplexities and the relative inconveniences 
it engenders,100 is reasonably settled on a fairly rational basis.101 
Although avoidance of fixture filing problems was doubtless a strong 
motivating factor in retaining the essence of the statute, it would 
also appear102 that the New York legislators were conscientiously 
trying to solve the broader question posed by the requirements of 
long-term finance ignored by the Code. Until it is generally recog-
nized, as it has been in New York, that the corporate mortgage is 
96. Mr. Homer Kripke, also a member of the Permanent Editorial Board's Sub-
committee No. 3 To Consider Article 9. 
97. Kripke, supra note 79, at 77. 
98. Ibid. Cf. the Transmitting Utility Place of Filing Act, recently approved 
by the American Bar Association. Section 2 (a) states: "If filing is required under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the proper place to file in order to perfect a security 
interest in personal property or fixtur~ of a transmitting utility is in the office of 
(the Secretary of State)." Cf. also the addition to U.C.C. § 9-302 prepared by the 
Association of American Railroads: 
"(5) Except as provided in this subsection, the filing provisions of this Article 
do not apply to a security interest in property of any description or any interest 
therein created by a mortgage made by a corporation which is a railroad or a 
public utility . • . but the mortgage shall be recorded and filed in accordance 
with the following requirements: 
"(a) The mortgage shall be recorded in (the appropriate office of each county 
in this state) in which any real estate described in the mortgage is situated; and 
"(b) the mortgage shall be filed in the office of the (Secretary of State or 
appropriate state official) if the mortgage includes any rolling stock, movable 
equipment or machinery or any other personal property .... 
"To the extent that any mortgage heretofore executed has been filed or 
recorded as provided herein, it need not be re-filed or re-recorded thereunder, 
and nothing hereunder shall be deemed to impair the lien or effect of any 
mortgage heretofore executed which has been recorded or filed in accordance 
with the laws of this state applicable thereto prior to the effective date of this 
Act." 
See also Billyou, A Proposal for a Federal Railroad Mortgage Recording Statute, 26 
ICC PRAcrITIONERS J. 424 (1959). 
99. See notes 23-40 supra and accompanying text. 
100. Even in New York, borderline cases would require the multiple filing and 
recording discussed in the text accompanying notes 36-40 supra. 
101. See the cases and authorities cited note 26 supra. 
102. No information as to the relevant legislative debates and hearings has been 
discovered. Cf. Breuer, Legislative Intent and Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpreta-
tion in New York, 51 L LIBRARY J. 2 (1958). 
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fundamentally different from the conditional sale and other short-
term security devices and should be treated differently, the Code's 
goal of conceptual unity for all transactions creating security interests 
cannot be effectively achieved. The Code draftsmen, while eliminat-
ing many of the difficulties of the pre-Code law, have, in this instance, 
refused to acknowledge important conceptual and practical dif-
ferences. 
The statutory scheme that has been enacted in New York in an 
attempt to fill the void left by the Code creates two partial exceptions 
to the Code's goal of one uniform filing system for all security 
interests in personal property. The debtor with a place of business 
in one county only will not be required to file locally if his assets 
are encumbered by a combined mortgage103 although if the mort-
gage covered only personal property, such a debtor would have to 
file in the county where he was doing business.104 This exception 
dims considerably in importance when it is recalled that the new 
system requires central filing.105 It will not be an oppressive burden 
on the searcher looking for a corporate debt to utilize the central 
records at the state capital instead of relying exclusively on the local 
records.106 Further, the requirement of local filing for debtors having 
a place of business in only one county is of dubious value in the first 
instance,107 although it has many supporters.108 The other filing 
exception in New York is the absence of any requirement of a 
record of secured corporate debt in the local fixture records. This 
exception is also relatively unimportant, not only for the reason 
previously noted, but also because the indenture itself will be 
located in the same office in which fixture filings are to be made.109 
Mr. Coogan has suggested an Ohio recording and filing system, 
now repealed, as a possibly desirable alternative to the present New 
York system.110 The Ohio statute was unique in that it applied to 
any combined mortgage of both real and personal property regard-
103. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(k); N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-1. 
104. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c). 
105. See the statutes cited note 103 supra. 
106. Searching services will provide a rapid and efficient way of discovering 
any security for earlier debts if the practitioner finds it inconvenient to search the 
central records personally. Even if the local filing exception for corporate 
mortgagors did not exist, complete reliance on local records is fraught with traps 
for the unwary. See, e.g., In the Matter of J &: J Baking Co., 18 App. Div. 2d 691, 
236 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (pre-Code local filing). 
107. See 1 COOGAN § 6.11(3). 
108. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, 19 Bus. LAw. 5, 27 (1963) (remarks of Mr. 
Coogan). 
109. Fixture filing is to be done "in the office where a mortgage on the real 
estate ••• would be ••• recorded," N.Y. U.C.C. § 9;40l(l)(b), and N.Y. LIEN LAw 
§ 190-1 requires that all corporate indentures be recorded "in each county where 
such real property is located." It would be a small burden for the fixture searcher 
to check both sets of records in the same office. 
110. 1 CoOGAN § 3.13. 
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less of the nature or status of the mortgagor.111 Mr. Coogan acknowl-
edges, however, that the entire area of long-term finance under the 
Code requires restudy.112 It would appear that extending the benefits 
of the liberal filing requirements of section 190 to any mortgagor 
of both real and personal property, whether or not incorporated, 
would be somewhat more democratic, but also unnecessary, inasmuch 
as the combined mortgage on both kinds of property is utilized prin-
cipally by large corporations with good credit ratings. Mr. Coogan's 
suggestion seems to run counter to the prevalent sentiment that favors 
a statute considerably more restrictive in scope than that adopted in 
New York.113 Although the system promulgated by New York is a de-
parture from the Official Text of the Code, and to that extent involves 
a disregard of the Code's goal of uniformity among all states,m 
these provisions attempt to solve a problem ignored by the Code. 
They should be considered an appropriate addition to the Official 
Text, rather than a radical departure therefrom. 
Aside from the question of where to file, another problem inci-
dent to filing post-Code corporate mortgages in New York is that of 
ascertaining what must be filed in order to perfect the security 
interest. The Code now permits "notice filing" for most secured 
transactions, whereas prior New York law allowed this type of filing 
only for transactions in inventory.115 The security agreement,116 
the indenture itself, typically runs to many pages, but only a brief 
"financing statement" need be filed, the requisites for which are enu-
merated in section 9-402.117 While the generality of description of 
the collateral allowed in that section is highly beneficial to the 
short-term lender financing goods with a rapid turnover,118 it does 
not serve the corporate mortgagor and its lender so well. If a very 
broad description as permitted by section 9-402 is utilized in per-
fecting a corporate mortgage, a subsequent potential lender on 
111. Ohio Acts, 1959, § 1319.03, at 9. 
112. 1 COOGAN § 3.13. 
113. See note 98 supra. On the problem of the filing of corporate indentures, 
four positions have been taken: (1) The Official Text of the Code admits of no 
exception for corporate debt; (2) Many feel that an exception should be made 
for only the most far-flung of the corporate mortgagors, i.e., the railroads and public 
utilities; (3) New York excepts all corporate mortgages; (4) Ohio previously excepted 
any mortgage which included both real and personal property. Michigan •has chosen 
the second alternative. Unless the Permanent Editorial Board or a legislature can 
effectively classify corporations by size and distribution of its property, a seemingly 
hopeless task, the New York solution seems the most desirable of the four alterna• 
tives. Geographical distribution of property is certainly not restricted to railroads 
and public utilities. The aforementioned fixture filing questions will be posed for 
all large debtors. 
114-. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c). 
115. 1 COOGAN § 3.06(1). See generally id. §§ 6.01-.15. 
116. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(h) broadly defines a security agreement as "an agree-
ment which creates or provides for a security interest." 
117. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-402. 
118. l COOGAN § 13.04(1). 
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collateral not intended to be covered in the earlier indenture may 
shy away because of the possibility that the collateral may be later 
found to have been included.119 The subsequent lender will have no 
legal means of obtaining further information about the existing cor-
porate mortgage120 and, even if such information is given to him, he 
may still refuse to take the chance.121 Therefore, the indenture drafts-
man should be careful not to over- or underdescribe the collateral in 
the indenture;122 and the entire indenture, or at least the granting 
clauses, should be filed as the financing statement.123 In sum, the filing 
scheme for corporate indentures enacted by New York, while defi-
cient in several transitional particulars discussed below, is a construc-
tive response to a need pertaining to an important category of secured 
transactions largely ignored by the Code. 
III. PROBLEMS OF TRANSITION IN NEW YORK 
To perfect the security interest in personal property and fixtures, 
corporate mortgages recorded in New York prior to the effective 
date of the Code had to be recorded in accordance with section 231 
of the lien law. That section required merely that the mortgages 
be recorded in the real estate records where the real property 
covered in the mortgage was located,12i with a like procedure for 
supplementals.1215 Thereafter, no further filing or recording was 
demanded of the borrower. New Jork has attempted to provide 
a statutory system to aid the transition to the Code whereby the 
original validity of the indenture on record will be continued and, 
119. Id. § 13.04(2). 
120. U.C.C. § 9-208 gives the debtor the right to demand further information 
from the secured party, but no such procedure has been provided for one not a 
party to the original transaction. See 1 COOGAN § 6.08(5). 
121, Id. § 13.04(2). Mr. Coogan also points out that the lender may be able to 
obtain a purchase-money priority, but that this expedient is inconvenient and other-
wise undesirable. Id. at 1357 n.45. 
122. Id. § 13.04(1); cf. McCLELLAND 8e FISHER, CORPORATE MORTGAGE BOND ISSUES 
243-56 (1937). The customary drafting method is broadly to include collateral and 
thereafter specifically to exclude items. Id. at 244 n.28. If, on the other hand, the 
draftsman wishes to be certain that no further liens on any type of collateral will 
be perfected on any of the mortgagor's assets, he can include all the assets in the 
filing statement, even though these are not covered by the indenture. The debtor 
has to sign the financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-402(1). For additional safeguards, see 
KENNEDY, CORPORATE TRusr .ADMINISTRATION 61-62 (1961). 
123. 1 CoocAN §§ 3.13, 13.04. Another aspect of New York law benefiting corporate 
mortgagors is the abrogation of the rule requiring consent of the corporation's 
shareholders prior to the execution of a mortgage on any or all of the corporation's 
assets, unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation. N.Y. Bus. Co!U'. I.Aw 
§§ 202(a)(7), 911. Cf. N.Y. STOCK Co!U'. I.Aw § 16. It should be noted that the New 
York practitioner will also have to consider the possible effect of New York's new 
Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR). N.Y. Civ. PRAc. I.Aw (effective Sept. I, 1963). 
See 2 COOGAN § 21.03. 
124. N.Y. LIEN LAW § 231. 
125. Ibid. 
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in addition, whereby the security interests in personal property 
represented by the indenture will be transferred to the central 
filing system within one year from the date on which the Code 
took effect. Section 9-302(1 )(h) states that no financing statement 
need be filed to perfect the security interest in personal property 
in an existing indenture. Section 10-102(2) initially provides that 
prior transactions creating security interests under prior laws will 
continue to be governed by those prior laws. Section 10-101 makes 
explicit the fact that the U.C.C. applies only to transactions entered 
into subsequent to the date it takes effect.126 These and other provi-
sions, while seemingly clear as to the transition procedure, leave open 
several questions. 
A. Continuation Statements 
New York has appended several subsections to 10-102 which, in 
addition to continuing the validity of prior security interests under 
prior law repealed or modified by the U.C.C.,127 are clearly intended 
to force the holders of all outstanding security interests in person~ 
property to file a continuation statement in the central filing 
system.128 If such a statement is not filed, the security interest will 
lapse twelve months after the effective date of the Code or at 
the expiration date set forth in the instrument, whichever is 
earlier.129 Because of a seeming error of draftsmanship, it is doubtful 
whether the purpose of incorporating existing security interests 
into the central filing system has been effectuated. Section 10-102(2) 
provides that "the perfection of a security interest ... (b) which 
was perfected when this Act takes effect by a filing, refiling or record-
ing under a law repealed by_this Act and requiring no further filing, 
refiling or recording to continue its perfection, continues until and 
will lapse twelve months after the date this Act takes effect ... "130 
unless a continuation statement is filed in the interim. 
An existing corporate indenture, duly perfected pursuant to old 
section 231, would seem to fit this description inasmuch as it is a 
security interest which took effect by a recording prior to the U.C.C. 
and which requires no further filing or recording. But the indenture 
did not become perfected by a law repealed by the Code. Its 
perfection stemmed from section 231 of the lien law, which was 
specifically exempted from repeal.131 The draftsmen apparently 
126. Cf. N.Y. U.C.C._§ 9-102. 
127. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2). 
128. N.Y. U.C.C. § IO·l02(2)(a)-(c). 
129. Ibid. 
130. N.Y. U.C.C. § I0-102(2)(b). Cf. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-10-102 (Supp. 
1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 382-A: 9-401 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:10-101 
(Supp. 1964). 
l:H, N-Y, lJ,C,C, § 10-105. New York practice makes mandatory specific, aa 
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assumed that the amending and renumbering of 231 had "repealed" 
it sufficiently to bring corporate mortgages that were outstanding 
when the Code took effect within the terms of section 10-102(2)(b) 
(quoted above), but the express repealer provisions of section 10-105 
seem to negate that construction. The draftsmen added the words 
"or modified" after the word "repealed" in the initial part of 
10-102(2) in 1964,182 and the omission of the same phrase in sub-
sections (a), (b), and (c) has apparently impaired the goal of incor-
poration.138 Therefore, notice of these outstanding mortgages will 
not necessarily be found in the central filing system after September 
27, 1965, and it seems unlikely that the existing indentures will lapse 
on that date if no continuation statement has been filed.134 
However, the filing of the continuation statement in this situa-
tion offers relatively little inconvenience to the practitioner185 and 
may spare him much subsequent difficulty. In a case arising after 
September 27, 1965, where the continuation statement has not been 
filed within the prescribed period, a bankruptcy court, zealous in 
protecting general creditors, may conceivably void the mortgage as 
having lapsed on that date by the rationale that the draftsmen of 
section 10-102(2) succeeded in spite of themselves. This could be 
done only by finding that section 231 had been "repealed" sufficiently 
for the purposes intended by the draftsmen, and that the holders of 
security interests who did not comply by filing the continuation 
statement had consequently lost their security. In light of applicable 
language, this holding seems unlikely, but in the interest of safety 
it is advisable to file the continuation statement to eliminate the 
possibility of the security interest lapsing. 
B. After-Acquired Property 
The language of new section 190-2 of the lien law seems to 
indicate that it applies to outstanding corporate indentures; it 
opposed to general, repeal. Cf. U.C.C. § 10-103. For a short discussion of the 
problems involved in repeal by implication, see 47 IOWA L. R.Ev. 496 (1962). 
1!12. N.Y. LA.ws ch. 476 § 21 (McKinney 1964). 
13!1. All that would be needed to rectify this oversight would be the insertion 
of the words "or modified" after the word "repealed" in each of these subsections. 
134. Cf. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing Procedures for 
Railroad, Utility, and Other Corporate Debtors-Some Suggestions, 62 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 865, 876-78 (1964). 
135. At this point, it should be noted that § 10-102(2) requires filing in accordance 
with § 9-401(1) and not § 9-302(1), which may mean that the simplistic filing pro-
cedures of N.Y. LIEN LA.w §§ 190, 231 are arguably not applicable in this situation. 
If this construction is sound (it is opposed to common sense), multiple filing of the 
continuation statement therefore will be required if the indenture includes fixtures, 
N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l{l)(b), or if the debtor has a place of business in only one county, 
N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-40l(l)(c). Requirements for the contents of these special continuation 
statements are also enumerated in § 10-102(2), as is a reference_ to § 9-403(3), which 
requires an additional continuation statement to be filed every five years. 
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refers to "any such original mortgage" which "provides or provided" 
for the inclusion of after-acquired property.186 That section further 
stipulates that subsequent supplemental mortgages picking up such 
after-acquired property will have to be recorded where the original 
was recorded, filed in the department of state, and also recorded 
in any county in which the after-acquired property is located.187 
This provision, however, with its apparent reference to both existing 
and future mortgages, is somewhat incongruous in light of the Code 
subsections 9-302(l)(h) and (k). Subsection (k), which applies only 
to future mortgages, states that they shall be governed by section 
190. But subsection (h), dealing with mortgages recorded prior to 
the Code, refers only to 231 and does not mention 190. The question 
of whether section 190-2 was intended to apply to both existing 
and future indentures or only to the latter will become important 
in a situation where a supplemental executed subsequent to the 
Code under a mortgage executed prior to the Code has been recorded 
in accordance with section 231 but has not met the more stringent 
requirements of section 190-2. Except insofar as the security in the 
collateral secured by the supplemental can be salvaged by section 
9-401(2) (the provision purporting to save a partial security interest 
in the collateral for the party who has filed erroneously) it seems 
likely that the supplemental will not effectuate the lien on the after-
acquired property. 
Bankruptcy courts can become quite strict on the question of 
filing, and there seems to be no way to defeat the proposition that 
the supplemental is to be covered by section 190-2. By its terms, 
the only supplementals meant to be governed by section 9-302(l)(h), 
and, by reference, section 231, are those "heretofore" recorded,188 
a category into which this hypothetical supplemental cannot logically 
be construed to fit. The mere absence of reference to section 190 in 
subsection (h) does not necessarily support the implication that sup-
plementals executed subsequent to the Code are to be regulated 
only by section 231, the section to which express reference is made, 
especially in light of the language of section 9-302(l)(k), whose 
mention of "a supplemental mortgage ... hereafter recorded," can 
easily be construed to be applicable. Further, the language of section 
190-2 indicates that its provisions were intended_ to govern this situa-
tion.139 ' 
It might be argued that a supplemental is not covered by the 
Code because it is not a "transaction" within the meaning of section 
10-101; therefore, it would be in violation of section 10-101 to allow 
section 190-2, a provision intended to augment the Code, to predom-
136. N.Y. LIEN LAw § 190-2. (Emphasis added.) 
137. Ibid. 
138. N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(h). 
139. See note 136 supra and accompanying text. 
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inate. This argument, however, will probably not be accepted 
because a supplemental is virtually certain to be a transaction under 
the broad definition in section 9-102(l)(a).140 In any event, section 
190 is not a section of the Code and section 10-101 is inapplicable as 
to it. Therefore, supplemental mortgages to a pre-Code mortgage 
executed subsequent to the adoption of the Code should be filed in 
the manner specified by section 190-2 to ensure their validity in the 
event of the debtor's bankruptcy. 
The preceding discussion of supplementals is relevant only if the 
practitioner desires to continue utilizing that system of validation. 
That practice prevailed in pre-Code New York; frequently an after-
acquired property clause of dubious validity was inserted into the 
indenture, and thereafter the lien on the property subsequently 
obtained by the debtor was perfected with a supplemental mortgage, 
usually executed at yearly intervals.141 The question now arises as to 
what effect the Code will have on one of these possibly invalid after-
acquired property clauses in a prior mortgage which, if it had been 
executed under the aegis of the Code, would be valid. It is clear that 
the mere passage of the U.C.C. will generally not affect the rights 
and duties flowing from the terms of a pre-Code indenture.142 
Although section 10-102(2)(b), quoted earlier, evidences the desire of 
the legislators to incorporate the outstanding mortgages into the cen-
tral filing system, the filing of a continuation statement pursuant to 
that section, whether or not it is necessary, will not serve to bring 
the indenture itself under the substantive provisions of the Code, 
but will merely prevent an early lapse of the security interest.143 This 
interpretation is reinforced by a subsequent subsection of 10-102 
which, in another situation, provides that the prior security interest 
in question "continues under" the Code.144 The apparently delib-
erate omission of this phrase in subsection (b) demonstrates that the 
Code was not intended to extend blanket coverage to the pre-Code 
transactions defined in that subsection. On the other hand, the lan-
guage of section 10-102(2) does make possible an argument that the 
parties are given an election as to the law under which their inden-
ture is to be governed and could therefore validate the questionable 
clause merely by expressing a desire to be ruled by the Code. U tiliza-
tion of the word "may"145 in the phrase pertaining to the enforce-
140. See also 1 COOGAN §§ 13.03(2), 13.03(3): "9-204(1) seems fairly clear in 
recognizing that separable security interests arise as each new lot of collateral comes 
under the indenture.'' 
141. Id. § 13.04 at 1362 n.53(2). Cf. N.Y. Laws 1954, ch. 754, § I. 
142. See I COOGAN § 13.03(2). 
143. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2): " ••• [the] security interC!it ••• (b) ••• will lapse 
• • • unless • • • a continuation statement is filed . • • .'' 
144. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(3)(a). 
145. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2): " ••• the rights, duties and interests flowing from 
[prior secured transactions] • • • remain valid thereafter and may be terminated, 
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ability of prior transactions, instead of the more definite "shall," 
created the question. However, it is unlikely that this construction 
would be adopted by any court in view of the confusion that would in-
evitably result and the ease with which the subsection can be con-
strued to be absolute rather than permissive.146 To bring the prior in-
denture under the terms of the Code, it is necessary to enter into a 
transaction or an event as required by section I 0-101 ;147 the Code does 
not automatically include it in its coverage. 
The parties to an outstanding mortgage with an after-acquired 
property clause when the Code took effect will, in all probability, 
wish to bring the indenture within the Code's coverage. Besides the 
obvious advantage of validating the after-acquired property clause, 
the Code generally makes secured transactions easier, cheaper, and 
more secure for all parties concerned.148 But there may be reason 
for the secured party under a prior indenture to wish also to remain 
within the coverage of pre-Code law. Many of the provisions of 
Article 9 have yet to be tested in court,149 and doubts have been 
expressed as to the efficacy of some of the security interests created 
by the Code,150 since, in several instances, a possible conflict with the 
completed, consummated or enforced as required or permitted by any statute or 
other law repealed or modified by this Act as though such repeal or modification had 
not occurred •••• " (Emphasis added.) 
146. 1 CooGAN §§ 13.02(2); 2 id. § 16.04(3). Another possible but rather far. 
fetched argument could be made that § 10-102(3)(a) would suffice to bring the 
indenture within the Code's coverage automatically. That subsection requires that 
a security interest filed prior to the Code under a law repealed by the U.C.C. for 
which the Code would require no filing "continues under" the U.C.C. The lawyer 
attempting to obtain the Code's coverage for a pre-Code indenture for which no 
filing has been made could argue that no financing statement need be filed for 
indentures executed pursuant to § 9-302(l)(k) because such filing would be made 
in acordance with § 190 of ,the lien law rather than the Code. Therefore, the 
prior indenture is governed by the Code's provisions since no further Code filing 
is required. This argument would appear to be fallacious for at least two reasons. 
Any reasonable construction of § 9-302(l)(k) has to admit that that subsection, 
standing alone, requires the filing of a financing statement; also, the law under 
which the security interests of the indenture were perfected, old § 231 of the lien law 
was not "repealed." 
147. 2 COOGAN § 16.04(3). Cf. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 9-102(l)(a), 9-204(1); 2 COOGAN § 
16.04(4). 
148. See, e.g., 1 id. §§ 1.01-4.10; K.ripke & Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions-A 
Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commerdal Code, 17 RUTGERS L. REY. 
168 (1962); K.ripke, The Modernization of Concepts Under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commerdal Code, 15 Bus. LAw. 645 (1960); Schnader, The Case for the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 77 BANKING L.J. 633 (1960). For the viewpoint of the commercial 
lender, see Stidham, Secured Loans Under the Uniform Commercial Code (Article 
IX), 75 BANKING LJ. 475 (1958). 
149. Pennsylvania has the longest experience under the Code, and her courts 
have not yet been deluged by cases arising out of Article 9. See generally Goodwin, 
Article 9, Uniform Commercial Code-Pennsylvania Decisions on Secured Trans-
actions, Corporate Practice Commentator, Nov. 1961, p. 71; Kauffman, Section 
9-401(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code as Interpreted by the Courts, 68 CoM. 
L.J. 253 (1963). 
150. See the authorities cited note 60 supra. 
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Bankruptcy Act awaits the unwary. Also, where a choice exists, many 
practitioners hesitate to abandon the familiar law under which they 
have practiced to venture forth into the unknown ramifications of 
this complex statute.1151 
If the parties prefer to rely on the virtues of Article 9, the best 
method for obtaining the Code's coverage is to re-execute the original 
indenture and go through a regrant of the collateral, both extant 
and after-acquired.152 This procedure would certainly meet the afore-
mentioned transaction requirement and would dispel any doubt as 
to what collateral is governed by which law. However, the negotia-
tion, expense, and inconvenience this method will usually entail will 
prompt counsel to attempt to find an easier solution. The filing of 
either a financing or a continuation statement alone which merely 
refers to the existence of the prior indenture would not appear to be 
an adequate transaction for the purposes of section 10-101 and would 
therefore not suffice to bring the indenture under the Code.1153 On 
the other hand, if a financing statement were filed containing a re-
grant of the after-acquired collateral, this action arguably would serve 
to validate the inclusion of property thereafter acquired,154 but the 
uncertainty inhering in this procedure will probably limit drastically 
its wide utilization.11515 
The New York practitioner wishing to have the best of both 
statutory worlds, i.e., to have the original collateral governed by the 
liberal pre-Code filing rules and also to have the after-acquired prop-
erty clauses come under the provisions of Article 9, may possibly 
accomplish this coup by fulfilling the continuation statement filing 
requirement of section 10-102(2) and executing a supplemental mort-
gage pursuant to section 190-2, which picks up the property acquired 
since the last supplemental and also contains a regrant of after-
acquired property. The continuation statement would insure that 
the prior mortgage would not lapse156 and would continue to be 
governed by prior law.157 Whether the subsequent supplemental 
mortgage will be adequate to bring within the Code the after-
acquired collateral will depend upon whether such supplemental is 
determined to be a transaction.158 It would appear that a supplemen-
151. That Article 9 requires much new thought can be shown by the volume of 
literature it has generated. See, e.g., the annotations periodically printed in the 
Boston College Industrial b Commercial Law Review and the Article 9 bibliography 
in 9 WAYNE L. REv. at 666-72 (1963). But cf. l COOGAN §§ 2.01-.07 where it is 
argued that the changes are more of terminology than substance, and that the transi-
tion to the Code can be relatively painless. 
152. l CooGAN § 13.03(2), at 1351 n.36. 
153. N.Y. u.c.c. § 10-101. See l COOGAN § 13.03(2). 
154. l CooGAN § 13.03(2). 
155. Ibid. 
156. N.Y. U.C.C. § 10-102(2)(b). 
157. See notes 142-51 supra and accompanying text. 
158. See notes 140 and 147 supra. 
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tal would not be adequate to bring the original under the U.C.c.,m 
but section 9-204 makes explicit the proposition that either the in-
clusion of subsequent collateral or the making of a future advance 
will create a separable security interest160 and will suffice to bring 
that collateral or that advance within the substantive terms of Article 
9.161 In this connection, subsection 190-2 and -3 of the lien law 
could be argued apart from the above considerations in attempting 
to convince a court that a subsequent supplemental mortgage con-
taining a regrant of after-acquired property is all that is necessary to 
perfect both the security interest in the actual property covered by 
the supplemental and a lien on any other appropriate property there-
_after acquired by the debtor. The latter subsection stipulates that 
after-acquired property clauses that were valid without filing or 
recording prior to the Code will continue to enjoy the same validity, 
indicating that the legislative intention was to give a broad effect to 
these clauses.162 The former subsection by its terms covers the situa-
tion. 
To summarize, where a previously invalid after-acquired prop-
erty clause in an indenture existing at the effective date of the Code 
is sought to be validated, the safest procedure for implementing this 
goal is the re-execution of the indenture and a regrant of the collat-
eral. If this method is not utilized, a supplemental containing a re-
grant of after-acquired property should be executed, recorded, and 
filed pursuant to section 190 of the lien law. The mere filing of a 
:financing or continuation statement which only refers to the exist-
ence of the prior indenture will be ineffective for this purpose, as 
will be merely doing nothing in the belief that nothing further is 
required. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Code will generally be beneficial to the holders of long-term 
security interests in corporate assets. Indenture trustees' fears of the 
uncertain conglomerate pre-Code law have been somewhat allayed 
by provisions making the security interest more secure. It is now 
theoretically possible in Code states to create a valid continuing lien 
on any or all of the debtor's assets while no dominion over them need 
be maintained by the secured party. However, an authoritative judi-
159. 1 COOGAN § 13.03(2). 
160. See id. § 13.03(3). 
161. Ibid. 
162. It would appear that the main motivation behind the enactment of § 190-3 
was to reassure the railroads and public utilities, somewhat unnecessarily, that the 
after-acquired property clauses in their indentures, generally enforceable before the 
Code without the further recording of supplementals, would retain their validity. A 
possible interpretation of § 10-102(2)(c) would require the filing of a continuation 
statement for the security in property under these clauses acquired subsequently 
to the original indenture, but such a construction would be both linguistically 
dubious and contrary to § 190-3. 
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cial determination that the draftsmen of the Code have succeeded in 
their aim is necessary before the lender will place complete reliance 
in the more controversial sections of Article 9. Even with this assur-
ance, it is uncertain whether financiers will radically depart from 
their traditional lending procedures. One respect in which the Code 
is unsatisfactory is that, by neglecting to provide suitable rules for 
the filing of security in long-term debt, the Code imposes a large bur-
den of multiple filing on the shoulders of corporate debtors. New 
York has attempted to treat this problem ignored by the draftsmen 
of Article 9. The New York statutory sections relating to this prob-
lem as a whole give a coherent and intelligent solution. It is recom-
mended that those states ,considering adoption of the Code and other 
Code states not having made similar provision should study carefully 
the ramifications of the question together with the New York enact-
ment. The goal of uniformity among the states is an important one, 
but it would be realized in a more desirable manner if other states 
were to follow New York's lead in this area rather than if all unreserv-
edly accept the Code's lack of treatment. Other states should take 
cognizance, however, of certain deficiencies in the New York system, 
especially regarding the transition to the Code. More specifically, the 
seemingly inadvertent omission in section 10-102(2)(b) which sheds 
doubts on its effectiveness in requiring continuation statements 
could have been prevented had the draftsmen thought the problem 
through more completely in terms of corporate indentures. Other 
progeny of insufficient drafting consideration include both the un-
certainty in reference embodied in the dichotomy of sections 9-302 
(l)(h) and 190 and the lack of a concrete procedure for handling 
transitional problems. Such deficiencies are perhaps inevitable in the 
course of extended statutory tinkering, but at least some needed 
tinkering has taken place, and other states can profit both by New 
York's gains and mistakes. 
George C. Goggins 
